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Abstract:  To study the interaction between the player's actions and environment in 
economic management game such as launching some projects with pollution in a 
certain area, we consider the relation between the player’s interests and the 
environment. We introduce a so-called gross interest- environment game and the 
concept of common hazard degree based on binary number and n-person 
non-cooperative game theory. It is studied that properties of players’ utility functions 
and common hazard degree. Basic on the concept of N-M stable set in set of Nash 
equilibria, we prove environment crisis theorems. Our main results are as follows: if it 
is an Nash equilibrium that every enterprise launching the project with pollution and it 
is not an Nash equilibrium that every not doing, then it is the most probable to realize 
Nash equilibrium with the greatest common hazard degree. 
Key words: gross interest-environment game; common hazard degree; N-M stable 
set; environment crisis theorem 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the traditional economic management game, one does not consider the interaction between the 
players’ interests and the environment. The literature(Hardin G., 1968) is an example with which 
system economists are very familiar. The model shows that if a resource has no exclusive ownership, it 
will be excessively used (Zhang W.Y., 1996). This model is of great significance in environmental 
management science as well. For example, if fishermen should have unlimited fishing in high seas, the 
fish would be extinct. On the earth if enterprises should emit unlimitedly pollutants, the mankind 
survival environment would be increasingly worse.  
The literatures (Jiang D.Y., etc., 2006; Jiang D.Y., Computing, Information and Control) studied the 
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so-called condition games. The literature (Jiang D.Y., 2005) discussed applications of condition games 
to economic management science. The literatures (Jiang D.Y., 2005; Jiang D.Y., 2007 ) considered 
applications of them to environmental management science. These applications are be long to 
sustainable development issues in environmental and economic management sciences.  
However there are other subjects as well. For example, we consider the case that some enterprises in 
a region want to start some projects with pollution. If these enterprises do not consider the interaction 
between their interest and the environment that enterprises damage to the environment and the 
environment affect interest of the enterprises and other objects that dependent on the environment, then 
the game is the traditional one. However, such environment interfere cannot be underestimated for the 
players' interests.  
Our task will be to consider the environmental issues, a new game system that is gross interest – 
environment games. In the literature (Jiang D.Y., 2007), we introduced a so-called gross 
interest-environment game based on binary numbers and n-person non-cooperative game theory. It was 
studied that utility function of the game and conditions for Nash equilibria. In this paper, we shall study 
the concept of common hazard degree based on binary numbers and n-person non-cooperative game 
theory. It is studied that utility function of the game and properties of common hazard degree. Basic on 
the concept of N-M stable set in set of Nash equilibria (Jiang D.Y., 2007), we prove environment crisis 
theorems. 
 
2.  GROSS PROFIT-ENVIRONMENT GAMES 
 
A system [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A P   is called an n-person finite non-cooperative game, where {1,2,N   
, }n is the finite set of all players, iA  is the finite set of player i ’s actions (or pure strategies), the 
Cartesian product ii N
A A of iA  is the set of situations of the game, and the real value function 
:iP A R  is the player i ’s utility function, where 1( )i nP a a is the player i ’s utility under the 
situation 1( )na a . 
A situation
* *
1( )na a A is called Nash equilibrium if 
* * * * * *
1 1 1 1( ) (i i n i i i iP a a a P a a a a      * )na for any player i  and any action i ia A .  
In this paper, set of all Nash equilibria is denoted by NE . 
Let [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A P  be an n-person finite non-cooperative game. Every player i  has exactly 
two actions 1 and 0. When i  uses the action 1, he gets the gross profit ig , and on the other hand, he 
destroys the environment which make each j N of all players get an environmental negative utility 
1 1 1( 1 )i i nb b b b
je  
 
, where 1 1 1( 1 )i i nb b b b    is the corresponding situation. When all players use his 
action 0, none of them can get either gross profit or environmental negative utility.  
Let nB  be the set of binary numbers with the word length n , for example,  
1 {0,1}B  , 2 {00,01,10,11}B  and 3 {000,001,010,011,100,101,110,111}B  . 
We introduce the order relations on nB  as the following:（1） 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b   implies 
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that ' 1ib   " 1ib  ， 1,2, ,i n   and （2） 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b   implies that 1 ' 'nb b    
1 " "nb b and 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b  .  
It is obvious that  is a partial order relation and   a quasi order relation. 
Definition 1 An n-person finite non-cooperative game [ ;( );( )]i iN A P  is called a gross 
profit-environment game, if {1,2, , }N n  , {0,1}iA  and 
1
1
1( )
1 0( )
, 1
( )
, 0
n
n
b b
i i i
i n b b
i i
g e b
P b b
e b
     


， 1, 2, ,i n  , 
where 
10( ) 0nb bie  and the equal sign is holds if and only if 1 0 0nb b   . Where ig  is the 
player i ’gross profit when he uses the action 1, 
11( )nb b
ie

is the player i ’s negative utility when he uses 
the action 1 under the situation 1 1 1( 1 )i i nb b b b   , and
10( )nb b
ie

is the player i ’s negative utility 
when he uses the action 1 under the situation 1 1 1( 0 )i i nb b b b   .  
 
Theorem 1 （monotonicity of environmental negative utility） For a gross profit-environment 
game [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A P  , let 1( )nb b A  and 
1
1
1
0( )
( )
1( )
, 0
0
, 1
n
n
n
b b
b b i i
i b b
i i
e b
e
e b
    



, 1, 2, ,i n  . 
Then 
（1） 
1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nb b b b
i ie e   if 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b  ， 1,2, ,i n  , 
（2） 
1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nb b b b
i ie e   if 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b   ， 1,2, ,i n  , and 
（3） 
1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nb b b b
i ie e   if 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b   , 1,2, ,i n  . 
Proof：We prove only the case 1 ' ' 0 0nb b   . The case 1 ' ' 0 0nb b   is similar. 
（1）Let 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b  . We have " 0ib  if ' 0ib  .  So 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ' ') 0( ' '0 ' ') 0( " "0 " ") ( " ")n i i n i i n nb b b b b b b b b b b b
i i i ie e e e           . 
Similarly, we have 
1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nb b b b
i ie e  if ' 1ib  .  
（2）Let 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b   . Let ' 0jb  and " 1jb  for some (1 )j j n  . For any 
(1 , )i i n i j   , we analysis the three subcases: 
A． " 1ib   if ' 1ib  . It shows that the player i  is harmed by himself action 1 and the player j ’s 
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action 1 under the situation 1( " ")nb b . However the player i is not harmed by player j ’s action 1 
under the situation 1( ' ')nb b . Therefore 
1 1 1 1( ' ') 1( ' ') 1( " ") ( " ")n n n nb b b b b b b b
i i i ie e e e      . 
B．Let ' 0ib   and " 0ib  . Since " 1jb  , we have i j . This shows that the player i  uses the 
action 0 under the situations 1( " ")nb b and 1( ' ')nb b . However he is harmed by the player j ’s 
action 1 under first situation and not under the second one. Therefore 
             
1 1 1 1( ' ') 0( ' ') 0( " ") ( " ")n n n nb b b b b b b b
i i i ie e e e      . 
C．Let ' 0ib   and " 1ib  . Similarly, we have 
             
1 1 1 1( ' ') 0( ' ') 1( " ") ( " ")n n n nb b b b b b b b
i i i ie e e e      . 
To sum up, we obtain 
1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nb b b b
i ie e  , 1, 2, ,i n  . 
（3）It is obvious from (1) and (2).  
1( )nb b
ie

is called by joint name environmental negative utility. 
 
3.  COMMON HAZARD DEGREE 
 
Definition 3 
1( ) (1 1)
1 1 1
( ) nn nb bn i ii ih b b e e     is called common hazard degree of the 
situation 1( )nb b .  
By monotonicity of environmental negative utility, we have 
Theorem 2（Monotonicity of  Common hazard degree） 1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nh b b h b b   if 1 'b  
1' " "n nb b b   . 
It is explained as that the more the players who use their actions 1 are, the larger the common hazard 
degree is.  
 
Theorem 3（Common Hazard Degree Inequality） 
（1） 1( ) 0nh b b   iff 1 nb b   0 0 ,（2） 1( ) 1nh b b  iff 1 1 1nb b   , and（3）
10 ( ) 1nh b b  , 1(b   )nb A . 
Proof: By theorem 1, we have 
(1 1) (0 0) 0i ie e   , 1, 2, ,i n  . So 
(1 1)
1
0n ii e   . 
（1） 1( ) 0nh b b  if and only if 1
( )
1
0nn b bii e    if and only if 1( ) 0nb bie  , 1, 2, ,i n   if 
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and only if 0ib  , 1, 2, ,i n   if and only if 1 0 0nb b   . 
（2） Let 1( ) 1nh b b  . Then 1
( ) (1 1)
1 1
n
n nb b
i ii i
e e    , i.e. 1( )(1 1)1( ) 0nn b bi ii e e    . 
We have
1( )(1 1) 0nb bi ie e  , 1, 2, ,i n  , so 1( )(1 1) nb bi ie e  , 1, 2, ,i n  . Obviously, 
1 nb b  1 1  . Assume that 1 1 1nb b   . By theorem 1, we have that 1( )(1 1) nb bi ie e  , 
1, 2, ,i n  ,  a contradiction. Therefore 1 1 1nb b   .Conversely, let 1 1 1nb b   . By 
theorem 1, we have
1( )(1 1) nb b
i ie e  , 1, 2, ,i n  . Hence 1( ) 1nh b b  . 
（3） Obviously, 10 0 1 1nb b      , 1( )nb b A  .By（1）and（2）, the result is 
obtained. 
Theorem 3 shows that if all players use their actions 0, then the common hazard is smallest and vice 
versa; if all players use their actions 1, then the common hazard is largest and vice versa. 
 
4.  CONDITIONS FOR NASH EQILIBRIA 
 
Theorem 4 (0 0)  is an Nash equilibrium of the gross profit-environment game [ ; ( );iN A   
( )]iP  if and only if 
1(0 010 0)
i ig e   , 1, 2, ,i n  . 
Proof: (0 0)  is Nash equilibrium if and only if  
1(0 010 0)0 (0 0 0) (0 010 0)i i i iP P g e         , 1, 2, ,i n   
if and only if 
1(0 010 0)
i ig e   , 1, 2, ,i n  . 
Corollary If (0 0) is Nash equilibrium of the gross profit-environment game [ ;( ); ( )]i iN A P  , 
then
1 1 11( 1 )i i nb b b b
i ig e     , 1, 2, ,i n   ,for any 1 1 1( 1 )i i nb b b b A    . 
 
Theorem 5
(1 10 0)
m
 
is an Nash equilibrium of the game [ ;( ); ( )]i iN A P  if 
1(1 1 10 0)
i m
i ig e    , 
0(1 10 0 0)1(1 10 1 0)
mm j j
j j jg e e 
    
, 1, 2, ,i m  , 1, ,j m n   . 
Proof: Since 
0(1 0 10 0)1(1 1 1 0 0) 1(1 1 1 0 0)
mi m i m i
i i i ig e e e           , 1, 2, ,i m  , 
0(1 10 0 0)1(1 10 1 0)
mm j j
j j jg e e 
    
, 1, ,j m n   , 
We have that 
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0(1 101 10 0)
(1 101 10 0) mii imiP e 
     1(1 111 10 0) (1 111 10 0)i m
i i i i m
g e P       
,  
0(1 1 0 0 0)1(1 10 1 0)
(1 10 1 0) (1 10 0 0)mm j j
ji j j im j m j
P g e e P             
,  
1, 2, ,i m  , 1, ,j m n   . 
 
Theorem 6 (0 0)  must be realized if (0 0) NE .  
Proof: Let 
(1 10 0)
m
 
and (0 0) are Nash equilibria. By Corollary of theorem 4, we have  
1(1 1 10 0)
(1 1 10 0) 0 (0 0 0 0 0)i mi i i ii m i mP g e P   
        
, 1, 2, ,i m  ,  
0(1 10 0 0)
(1 10 0 0) 0 (0 0 0 0 0)m jj i im j m jP e P   
  
      
, 1, ,j m n   .  
Hence (0 0)  is better than 
(1 10 0)
m
 
 for every player. So (0 0)  must be realized. 
 
5.   N-M STABLE SETS 
 
Now we consider the case (0 0) NE . 
Definition 4 (Jiang D.Y., 2007; 2008)  ( \{(0 0)})V V NE    is called an N-M stable set of 
[ \{(0 0)}, ]NE    if it satisfies the conditions 
（1） ( ) ( ), ,a b b a a b V      and  (2) \ ( {(0 0)}), ,a NE V b V a b      . 
 
Theorem 7 (Jiang D.Y., 2007; 2008)  There exists one and only one N-M stable set in 
[ \{(0 0)}, ]NE   .  
 
Theorem 8 Suppose V is an N-M stable set in [ \{(0 0)}, ]NE   . Then for any a V , there 
exists none \{(0 0)}b NE  such a b . 
Proof: Assume there exist a V and \{(0 0)}b NE  such that a b . By the condition 1, 
we have \ ( {(0 0)})b NE V   . By the condition 2, we have b a . It contradicts to a b .  
Definition 5 An element \{(0 0)}b NE  is called a greatest element in [ \{(0 0)}, ]NE    
if ,a b a  \{(0 0), }NE b . 
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Theorem 9 { }V b is N-M stable set of [ \{(0 0)}, ]NE    if and only if b is the greatest 
element in \{(0 0)}NE  . 
  
6.  ENVIROMENT CRISIS THEOREMS 
 
Definition 6 A player ( 1 )j m j n    is called a sufferer about the situation (1 10 0)m  . 
 
Theorem 10 There exist elements in N-M stable set V whose common hazard degree is greater than 
that of any one in \ ( {(0 0)})NE V   and probability that they are realized is greater than that of 
any one in \ ( {(0 0)})NE V   . 
Proof: We have 
* *
1 1( ) ( )n nb b b b    for any 1( )nb b  \ ( {(0 0)})NE V   . By theorem 
3，we have that
* *
1 1( ) ( )n nh b b h b b  . And for any 1( ) \ ( {(0 0)})nb b NE V   , there 
exists 
* *
1( )nb b V such that * *1 1( ) ( )n nb b b b   . Sufferers about 1( )nb b  are more than 
ones about 
* *
1( )nb b . Therefore players to prefer 
* *
1( )nb b  are more than players to do 1( )nb b . 
Thus probability that 
* *
1( )nb b  is realized is greater than one that 1( )nb b is.  
 
Theorem 11 It is the most probable event to realize Nash equilibrium (1 1)  with the greatest 
common hazard degree if (1 1) NE and (0 0) NE . 
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